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Mariupol Urbicide Project — forensic evidence dossier

БЕСХОЗЯЙНАЯ

/bes·kho·ZYAY·na·ya/  ·  adjective  ·  ownerless; having no master

«Бесхозяйная недвижимая вещь» — “ownerless immovable thing,” the actual term of art used to take a Mariupol family’s home.

The word the Russian occupation writes beside a Mariupol family's home — after the siege that drove the family out, in the city that same army destroyed.

Since a federal law passed on 15 December 2025, the word alone is enough to take the home. It has been written 12,948 times. This is the documented record of who did it, how, and to whose benefit — assembled entirely from the occupiers’ own files, each one captured, hashed, and timestamped.

Background: Mariupol under siege, 26 March 2022 — satellite imagery © Airbus, via Google Earth

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01 — The city, and what was done to it

A port city of 425,000. Then eighty-six days.

Before 24 February 2022, Mariupol was ordinary in the way cities are ordinary: iron and steel works, a deep-water harbour, a university, an iconic drama theatre, the bus you took to work. That ordinariness is worth holding onto — because what follows is an administrative machine built to erase it from the record.

Russia’s full-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022, and the assault on Mariupol began the same day. Within days the city was encircled. By 2 March it had lost power, water, and sanitation; hundreds of thousands were trapped for weeks in basements without heat, telephone, or any reliable news of what was happening above them. On 9 March a strike hit a children’s and maternity hospital. On 16 March the Drama Theatre — the city’s main shelter, with ДЕТИ (“CHILDREN”) painted in letters large enough to read from orbit — was bombed; estimates of the dead there run from a dozen to roughly six hundred.

The human toll has never been fully counted, and the range is itself part of the record: the UN verified roughly 1,348 civilian deaths as a floor; Human Rights Watch, from satellite imagery of grave sites, estimated more than 8,000; Ukrainian officials say 25,000 or more. The UN assessed that up to 90 percent of the city’s multistorey residential buildings were damaged or destroyed. Of the half-million who had lived there, perhaps 150,000 remained by May, when the city fell. The displaced — scattered across Ukraine, Russia, and the world — are the dispossessed owners at the centre of everything that follows.

What came next was not reconstruction. It was a change of sovereign, imposed by law. On 30 September 2022 Russia declared annexation, formalised by federal constitutional law Federal Constitutional Law No. 5 of 4 October 2022, making Russian civil, land, and housing law applicable in Mariupol. The ruble, the passport, the registry followed. The city was renamed into a Russian administrative object, its streets re-lettered, its cadastre re-drawn — and its residents re-classified as people who must now prove, under the rules of the power that destroyed their city, that what was theirs is still theirs.

The Greek arkhē names at once the commencement and the commandment. Jacques Derrida · Archive Fever, 1995

Derrida traced the word archive to the arkheion — the house of the archons, the magistrates who commanded, where the official documents were kept and, crucially, interpreted. To hold the archive is to hold the power to decide what is recorded, what is recognised, and what is allowed to disappear. This is a precise description of what the occupation has built. It has seized the archons’ house. It has made itself the sole keeper and interpreter of the record of who owns what — and under the December 2025 amendment, inclusion in the registry is title. The entry in the list now is the law it speaks. The same apparatus that inscribes — twelve thousand homes entered as “ownerless” — also erases: it demolishes the building, renames the street, breaks the address, so that the destroyed property, on paper, no longer exists.

01.5 — From their own mouth

Before the evidence, here is the sales pitch.

In November 2023 a decorated Russian state-media journalist, Regina Orekhova — a 2022 “Golden Quill” laureate, reporting for RIA Novosti — released a half-hour feature on Mariupol’s real-estate market: “Shock Prices on Mariupol Apartments. Mortgages, New Builds and Reconstruction.” Exiled independent media cannot get this access; she is the propaganda. And in trying to sell the city as an investment, her own footage narrates the entire seizure pipeline — on the record, a year before this project documented it from the decrees.

Regina Orekhova (right) inspects a burned-out, rubble-filled Mariupol apartment with the flat's former resident Regina Orekhova (right) inspects a “priceless investment”: the ruins of someone’s home valued at 5 million rubles

Primary source · Russian state media · RIA Novosti, Nov 2023

An estate agent explains the business model

Walking a state reporter through gutted, rubble-filled flats whose owners “left in a great hurry,” the agents are candid about who this is for — and who it is structurally not for. Three quotes carry the whole argument.

“The subsidised mortgage is pegged to your salary — so the locals can’t qualify.”

— Mariupol estate agent, on the federal 2% scheme. The only work available to siege survivors is rubble-clearing or minimum wage, ineligible for the mortgage.

“It’s a new building, a different address — so there’s no claim to compensation.”

— On flats rebuilt on a demolished footprint. The address break, narrated as a feature. This is Modality 1, described aloud.

“We locals can’t afford these. It’s just Russians from Russia buying them.”

— A second agent, on the record, to a Russian government representative. The population transfer, stated plainly.

Why this matters evidentially: the displaced-owner harm, the address-laundering, the citizenship-and-income gate, and the population transfer are not inferences drawn by investigators — they are the occupier’s own promotional apparatus describing the scheme as a selling point. “Documents registered in Rosreestr,” the listings add, offered to buyers as a bankable guarantee of title to a Ukrainian family’s home. Source: Alexey Kovalev, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine is an Ultraviolent Settler-Colonial Project,” July 2024, analysing the Orekhova documentary (RIA Novosti, Nov 2023).

A note on language · разрушка

The agent on camera calls the bombed-out flat a razrushka — and the word is its own small confession. The Russian suffix -ushka is a diminutive of endearment, the one that turns ded (grandfather) into dedushka (gramps). Its root here is razrushit’ — to destroy. A razrushka is a destroyed thing made to sound cozy: a fixer-upper, an opportunity. It is the bureaucratic violence the whole record runs on, compressed into a single affectionate noun — the archive that speaks the law while making the crime sound charming.

02 — The evidence of intent

The machine was built while the city burned.

The strongest proof that this was premeditated is chronological. On one side of the line below is what was done to the people of Mariupol. On the other is the paperwork of seizure. Read the dates together. The master land-seizure predicate was signed on 6 April 2022 — while families were still dying in basements, and nearly six months before the annexation that supposedly made any of it legal. The machine predates its own legal basis.

The siege
what was done to people
24 Feb 2022
Full-scale invasion
The assault on Mariupol begins the same day.
2 Mar 2022
City cut off
Power, water, heat, and sanitation lost; hundreds of thousands trapped.
9 Mar 2022
Maternity hospital struck
A children’s and maternity ward hit by airstrike.
16 Mar 2022
Drama Theatre struck
The city’s main shelter, marked ДЕТИ. Up to ~600 killed.
Mar–May 2022
The dead, uncounted
UN floor 1,348; HRW grave analysis 8,000+; Ukraine 25,000+. ~90% of housing damaged.
May 2022
The city falls
~150,000 remain of a prewar 425,000. The rest are displaced.

One city. Two ways to take a home.

03 — The system

Two modalities of dispossession

Every documented seizure follows one of two tracks. The difference is whether the building is destroyed or left standing — but the destination is identical: a Ukrainian-owned home becomes Russian-held title, sold or allocated to the occupier’s own population. Both tracks are evidenced entirely from the occupation’s own records.

Parallel branch · housing allocation
Seized stock is also allocated directly to the occupier’s officials, military, and police as employer-provided housing (служебное жильё) — a second population-transfer channel running alongside the resale market.
Connective layer · toponymy
≈75 streets renamed sever the address itself, so a destroyed or seized property “no longer exists” against the pre-war Ukrainian record — defeating compensation by erasing the name.

The full pipeline — every legal instrument, three-tier sourcing, and the evidence still to be retrieved — is mapped in the interactive Dispossession Pipeline exhibit.

Every rung of that pipeline is a person.
Here are two of them.

Judicial rung · most prolific signer

Dmitry Romanov
Романов Дмитрий Сергеевич

Ruled in 288 «ownerless» transfer petitions — more than any of the ~27 named judges sitting across Mariupol’s occupation courts. Each ruling converts one особое производство petition into municipal title, typically on a single hearing. Not a local appointee: he is a Justice of the Peace (мировой судья) from Tver, Russia, installed on the Zhovtnevy District Court bench by presidential decree (Decree No. 723, 27 Sep 2023) — a Russian jurist parachuted in to staff the occupation’s own court.

Denis Gnezdilov in Russian prosecutorial uniform with service decorations

Prosecutorial rung · petitioner of record

Denis Gnezdilov
Гнездилов Денис Владимирович

Senior Counsellor of Justice, Mariupol city prosecutor’s office. Filed «ownerless» expropriation petitions in his own name — a prosecutorial body running the same civil-expropriation pipeline as the administration’s own decrees, a distinct accountability lane. Also not local: before his transfer he was district prosecutor of Usman District, Lipetsk Oblast, Russia (source).

Photo: VK, via Lipetsk-oblast prosecutorial channel

Neither is a local collaborator — both were career officials moved in from mainland Russia to staff Mariupol’s occupation institutions: a Tver magistrate handed a courtroom, a Lipetsk-oblast prosecutor handed a city.

Named from this project’s stakeholder-network graph (52 persons, sourced from court-case records and decree signatures) — see the full Stakeholder Network exhibit.

04 — Three records, documented end to end

просп. Нахимова 82 intact before 2022
Before 20224-storey block · 36 flats · privately owned
The building destroyed, 2022
March 2022100% destroyed · burned in the siege
New residential building constructed on the cleared Nakhimova 82 footprint, rebranded per. Chernomorsky 1B
2024–2026Rebuilt · new address · 94.3% sold

Case study I · Modality 1 · demolition & address-laundering

prosp. Nakhimova, 82 per. Chernomorsky, 1B

A 36-apartment, privately owned building was destroyed in 2022, demolished by occupation order DNR State-Committee Directive No. 56, and replaced on the same footprint by a 51-apartment building registered at a new address with a new cadastral number — now sold, overwhelmingly to Russian buyers, while the original owners are off the map. One number, the cadastral, stitches the old footprint to the new title.

Intact · 36 flats Destroyed 100% Demolished · №56 · 29.09.2022 Land · №289 · no auction Rebuilt 29.12.2023 · 51 flats 94.3% sold
36→51
flats · owners replaced by incomers
94.3%
sold via 2% federal mortgage
~10 m
between old and new footprint
93:37:0010410:173
the cadastral that ties old to new
View the full case exhibit — imagery, video, panorama, registry →

Case study II · Modality 2 · flat-by-flat registry sweep

131 flats · 3 buildings · being sold right now

Where the building still stands, the occupation processes its contents — flat by flat — through the “ownerless” registry that, since the Dec 2025 federal law, constitutes title without any court. Specific, identifiable units in these same buildings are being actively advertised on Russian Telegram classifieds, with repost campaigns proving the listings are live. One building has five percent war damage. Its 23 apartments are being sold.

131
flats on the ownerless registry · 64 + 44 + 23
20×
most-reposted unit · one month
5%
war damage at Sechenova 54 — sold anyway
1 phone
selling 2 units in the same 23-flat building
prosp. Stroiteley 108 · 64 flats prosp. Lenina 100 (← prosp. Myru) · 44 flats ul. Sechenova 54 · 23 flats · 5% damage

The listings state verbatim: “Documents registered with Rosreestr” — the occupation’s title apparatus presenting itself to buyers as a bankable guarantee.

View the full case exhibit — listings, repost cadence, seller linkage →

Case study III · Modality 3 · block-level demolition, one developer

prosp. Stroiteley, nos. 74–88 “Rezidentsiya Select”

Five consecutive residential buildings — nos. 74, 76, 78, 80 and 88 — were demolished under occupation orders and re-registered as five cadastral parcels granted to the same developer, for one branded condominium complex. The land-grant decrees are five consecutive numbers issued as a single administrative package, signed by the same official — the documentary signature of a pre-planned block-level seizure, not five separate condition-based decisions. All five addresses carry a courtyard grave-site record from the 2022 siege.

5
buildings demolished, one developer, one complex
390–394
five consecutive land-grant decree numbers
828
new flats built across the five footprints
5
courtyard grave-sites recorded at these addresses
UNOSAT: “Moderate damage” · 12 May 2022 Demolished by occupation order 5 decrees, 1 developer, 1 complex
View the full case exhibit — block schematic, grave records, UN damage assessment →

Case study IV · the now-closed court route · special proceeding

28 judges · 2,666 rulings · not one named address

Before the Dec 2025 law made registry inclusion alone constitute title, the same conversion ran through four occupation courts as a special proceeding with the city as petitioner and no named defendant. Twenty-eight judges signed at least one of 2,666 rulings. The public case-card record of every single one — the only public trace of the ruling — names no street, building, or cadastral number.

2,666
rulings · 4 district courts
28
named judges, full ruling record
82.2%
granted, median 42 days
0 / 2,666
address-linked on this project’s spine
Filed · no named defendant Granted in ~27 days, one hearing Superseded · Dec 2025 law
View the full case exhibit — every judge named, two rulings decoded in full →

05 — The scale

12,948 homes the occupation says belong to no one.

These are some of the addresses our pipeline has documented on the seizure spine — real buildings, drawn from the occupation’s own registry and resale data. Each one is a home. Below them is the full count: one mark for every individual “ownerless” entry in the master registry.

Each dot is one registry entry marked “marks of ownerlessness” — signs of ownerlessness. 12,948 of them. The highlighted marks are the addresses named above.

UN HRMMU · 38,000+ properties flagged “potentially abandoned” (Nov 2025) HRW · ~8,000 court cases, 25 courts (May 2026) BBC Verify · 5,700 Mariupol homes marked for seizure (2025) Dossier Center · ~7,000 “ownerless” units, list growing weekly Le Figaro · ~13,000 Mariupol homes confiscated Rosreestr (RF) · ~550,000 across occupied Ukraine (Aug 2025)

This project’s 12,948 individual entries are the building-by-building, flat-by-flat substructure beneath those headline totals — the same phenomenon independently confirmed by the UN, HRW, the BBC, Bellingcat, the Dossier Center, and Russia’s own registrar, here resolved to the level of the named property, decree, and beneficiary.

06 — Who operates it

A chain of command, from the apex signer down.

The seizure is not faceless. It runs from a single apex signer — the head of the occupation administration who personally signed every appointment and the land-reallocation orders — down through republic ministries, the Mariupol officials who sign the “ownerless” decrees, the judges who ruled the transfers, and the mainland-Russian shell companies that received the cleared land. ≈52 persons, 53 organisations, 138 documented relations, ~8,100 evidenced acts.

The command spine

Denis Pushilin
Пушилин Денис Владимирович
Head of the DNR · apex signer
Signed 50/51 land-reallocation orders & every appointment decree below
Konstantin Ivashchenko
Иващенко Константин Владимирович
appointed 06.04.2022
First occupation head of Mariupol
Oleg Morgun
Моргун Олег Валериевич
appointed 23.01.2023
156 ownerless decrees
Anton Koltsov
Кольцов Антон Викторович
appointed 13.06.2025 · current (acting)
652 ownerless + 16 demolition decrees — the operational centre of gravity
~8,100
evidenced acts across the network
Federal RF — funding & contracting
DNR republic — law, land, adjudication
Mariupol municipal — execution
Judicial — ~27 named judges
Commercial — shell developers
region-93
every looked-up developer is a post-occupation shell; every disclosed founder is mainland Russia (Moscow / Rostov)

→ Explore the full directed graph — 111 nodes, tier filters, Rome-Statute overlay — in the interactive Stakeholder Network exhibit.

07 — How we know

The occupiers’ own files, captured against tampering.

The evidence base is built almost entirely from the perpetrator’s own records — occupation courts, registries, decrees, and Russian federal trackers. That is its strength: the records are self-incriminating, dated, and signed. Every artifact is captured before it is parsed, hashed with SHA-256, and timestamped at retrieval, so the chain of custody is reproducible from raw source to finished claim.

Volume
211,900 artifacts
70 GB raw store · every court card, registry page, decree, and listing captured verbatim.
Integrity
SHA-256 + UTC
A cryptographic hash and retrieval timestamp on every file — any later alteration is detectable.
Standard
Berkeley Protocol
Open-source investigation methodology for digital evidence in international proceedings.
Corroboration
Independent cross-checks
A property is legal-grade only when independent records agree — 1,155 clear that bar — and more than 580 are additionally confirmed by an independent UN satellite damage assessment, so the case does not rest on the occupation’s paperwork alone.

Capture → parse pipeline

Parsing never touches the live source. The immutable raw store is the single point of truth; everything downstream is re-derivable from it.

Live occupation source Capture + SHA-256 + timestamp Immutable raw store Parse structured evidence database Claim / dossier

08 — Independent verification

A second, independent eye on the ground.

The paper trail is strong, but it shares one provenance. The corroboration layer adds an entirely separate family of evidence — operated not by the occupier but by UN analysts and Earth-observation satellites — that confirms, dates, and where necessary refutes what the occupation files assert.

Wave 1 · in progress

What independent imagery establishes

Cross-referencing each property against UN damage assessments and dated satellite scenes proves the physical sequence — war-damaged → standing → administratively razed → rebuilt for the occupier’s market — that no paper record alone can. It defeats the “we only cleared dangerous ruins” defence, and for standing buildings it proves the opposite: intact, owner simply locked out.

UN damage attestation
UNOSAT building-level damage assessment (12 May 2022, ~5,647 structures), matched to the property spine: 589 properties fall within 25 m of an independently assessed war-damaged structure — an independent UN record of war damage at a fixed date, with no link to the occupation administration.
Satellite date-bracketing
Sentinel-2 before/after scenes bracket each demolition between two dates — timestamping the occupation’s razing against the prior war damage.
Intactness proof
For the registry-sweep buildings: imagery showing the structure standing while its flats are declared ownerless — the A3.6 “loss of access” case.

09 — Not an aberration. A method.

A decade in the making, now at national scale.

What happened to Nakhimova 82 is not improvised wartime opportunism. It is the latest application of a tested state technique — refined in occupied Crimea after 2014, then deployed across every territory Russia has seized since 2022. Human-rights lawyers who track it are explicit: “Crimea became a testing ground. Moscow tested its tools there before applying them to newly occupied regions.”

2014–2020 · CRIMEA
The testing ground
Serial “nationalisation” decrees from 2014; a 2020 Putin decree bars “foreigners” from owning property. Foreign-owned plots fall from 13,859 to ~5,500.
2022– · MARIUPOL & THE SOUTH-EAST
The method, scaled
The same instruments — ownerless designation, citizenship gates, in-person requirements, court transfer — applied to homes emptied by siege across Mariupol, Melitopol, Berdyansk, Kherson.
By AUG 2025 · OCCUPIED UKRAINE
The national total
Russia’s own registrar, Rosreestr, records properties seized as “ownerless” across occupied Ukraine:
~550,000

The law the displaced owner stands on

Loizidou v. Turkey · European Court of Human Rights, 1996

A Greek-Cypriot refugee, barred since 1974 from her property in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus, won a landmark ruling that an unrecognised occupation regime cannot validly extinguish title. The court held that the occupier’s “expropriation” law was legally void, that the owner remained the lawful owner, and that denial of access was a continuing violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.

This is the precise doctrine under which every record in this project is evidence of a seizure, not a transfer of ownership. The occupation’s registry entry does not make the incomer an owner; it makes the displaced Ukrainian a victim of an ongoing wrong — one that does not expire, and one for which the Cyprus precedent already established a right to reparation.

The precedent, applied to this war

Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC] · European Court of Human Rights, 9 July 2025

The Grand Chamber consolidated four inter-state applications — covering Crimea (2014), Donbas (2014), the downing of MH17, and the full-scale invasion (2022) — into the first judicial ruling by an international court formally establishing Russia’s responsibility for the consequences of the full-scale invasion. The Court found Russia responsible for a systematic administrative practice of Article 1 Protocol 1 (property) violations, expropriating civilian property “without compensation or access to an impartial remedy,” and treated the violations as “a coherent strategy rather than isolated incidents.”

Loizidou supplied the principle in 1996; this 2025 judgment is the Court ruling, on this war, against this respondent, that the principle holds. A parallel-track corporate case tests the identical theory at industrial scale: Metinvest has filed 16+ ECtHR claims (from Oct 2022) over the Azovstal and Ilyich steelworks, and Rinat Akhmetov’s SCM has filed a treaty claim seeking $17–20bn, both arguing the DNR/LNR administrations have been “acting under Russian direction or control since 2014” — the same attribution chain a residential claim depends on. Sophisticated litigants are pressing, at industrial scale, the theory this project assembles evidence for at the level of a single flat.

10 — Where every piece points

Two endpoints: restitution, and prosecution.

The project is built backwards from two destinations. Every structured record is tagged to the claim category or criminal article it supports — so the same evidence base serves a displaced owner’s compensation claim and an international prosecutor’s file.

Council of Europe · Register of Damage for Ukraine

A3.6Loss of access to property in occupied territory — applies to every dispossessed owner in both modalities.
A3.1 / A3.2Destruction of residential and non-residential property — the demolition track, corroborated by the federal damage tracker and, for a subset, an independent UN satellite damage assessment.
A3.3Loss of housing — the displaced who cannot return to a home now allocated or sold.

Rome Statute · International Criminal Court

8(2)(a)(iv)Extensive appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity, carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
8(2)(b)(xiii)Destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property — the demolition and the registry seizure alike.
8(2)(b)(viii)Transfer of the occupier’s own civilian population into occupied territory — the resale and employer-housing (служебное жильё) channels.
Art. 28 / 25(3)(b)Command responsibility — the apex-to-signer chain documented in the network.

Why the per-property dossier is the deliverable

The Register of Damage for Ukraine has grown fast since this project began: the EU joined as a full participant in July 2024, more than 10,000 residential-property claims are already filed, and the Register expects 300,000–600,000 property claims in total against a World Bank recovery estimate of $486bn. Legal scholarship now argues the European Court may adopt a pilot-judgment approach — directing the 9,000+ individual property applications already before it toward RD4U as the effective remedy, rather than deciding each one individually. If that channelling happens, a structured, source-hashed, per-property dossier like the one this project builds is not a convenience; it is the evidentiary substrate the channel requires.

11 — The record turned around

The archive built to forget becomes the instrument of memory.

The occupation built an archive to launder the seizure. Every “ownerless” designation names a property. Every ruling names a date, a judge, an enabling statute. Every land grant names a beneficiary; every demolition register, every re-addressed new build, every resale listing is a dated, self-incriminating artifact produced by the seizing authority itself. The same archive meant to make the theft lawful is the evidence of it.

The Mariupol Urbicide Project captures that record — forensically, at scale, with a documented chain of custody — and reassembles it onto a single evidentiary spine: which property, owned by whom, was taken how, by whom, when, and to whose benefit.

Whoever holds the archive holds the power to say what is and was. This is an attempt to hold the record open — to keep, against an apparatus built to forget, an account of what was taken and from whom.

For the displaced
Restitution
A per-property evidence dossier a Mariupol owner can attach to a Register of Damage claim.
For the record
Accountability
A structured, court-admissible case file for Rome Statute proceedings — appropriation, population transfer, command responsibility.